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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
IN RE: MEDICAL INDIGENCY 
APPLICATION OF C.H. 
(Gem County Case No. 16-026) 
ST. LUKE'S HEALTH SYSTEM, LTD., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF GEM 
COUNTY, IDAHO, in their official capacity 
as the Board of County Commissioners for the 
County of Gem, State of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
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PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Category L.3 
Fee: $221.00 
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4V V 
COMES NOW Petitioner St. Luke's Health System, Ltd., for and on behalf of its 
subsidiaries and affiliates, including without limitation St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd. 
and St. Luke's Clinic - Treasure Valley, L.L.C. ("Petitioner" or "St. Luke's"), by and through its 
undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5201, et seq. (Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act), petitions this Court for review of the Board of Commissioners of Gem County's 
("Board" or "County'') denial of the medical indigency application submitted on behalf of C.H. 1 
(hereinafter "Patient") requesting medical indigency assistance for services provided to her by 
Petitioner. 
I. 
The Patient is a medically indigent 63-year old woman residing in Gem County, 
Idaho. The Patient received medical services related to diabetes, hyperlipidemia, peripheral 
vascular disease, hypertension, and ulcerative colitis on dates of service January 26, 2016 
through March 9, 2016, incurring hospital bills for services in the amount of $320,451.02. 
II. 
The Petitioner filed a completed application for emergency necessary medical 
services with the department within 31 days of the date of admission pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 31-3505(3). 
III. 
During the County's investigation, the Patient and the Petitioner provided all 
material information requested by the County. 
1 Pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(g)(l), (h) and (i), St. Luke's has 
identified the Patient only by reference to the Patient's initials, and requests that the case be 
sealed in light of the Patient's privacy interests, and further requests that the title and caption of 
the case utilize only the initials of the Patient. 
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.. , 
5V 
IV. 
On September 19, 2016, the Board issued its Initial Determination of Approval 
for dates of treatment January 26, 2016, 2015 through February 3, 2016, under Case No. 2016-
026. The Initial Determination of Approval, however, makes no reference to dates of service 
February 4, 2016 through March 9, 2016. It contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law 
concerning such dates of service, but it appears the denial was based on the lack of medical 
records relating to those dates of service. 
V. 
St. Luke's thereafter timely appealed the Initial Determination which, implicitly, 
denied dates of service February 4, 2016 through March 9, 2016. 
VI. 
Further medical review by the County's medical expert, reflected in a report 
issued October 24, 2016, resulted in an opinion that the Patient no longer needed the services of 
an acute care inpatient hospital as of February 12, 2016, and therefore, dates of service from 
February 12, 2016 through March 9, 2016 were not medically necessary. 
VII. 
Additional notes and records were thereafter submitted to medical review, 
reflecting the unsuccessful efforts to transfer the Patient to a facility providing a lower level of 
care. The County's medical expert further revised his opinion, reflected in a report issued 
November 16, 2016, and found that dates of service January 26, 2016 through February 18, 2016 
were medically necessary and emergent. He determined that the inpatient stay from February 19, 
2016 to March 9, 2016 was not medically necessary because the Patient no longer needed the 
services of an acute care inpatient hospital. 
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The County held an appeal hearing on February 6, 2017. At the hearing, St. 
Luke's presented evidence of its substantial efforts to transfer the Patient to a lower level of care, 
including the fact that it was not successful in pursuing such efforts until March 9, 2016. The 
facility accepting the transfer did so only after St. Luke's entered into a single patient agreement 
with the other facility, providing that St. Luke's pay a daily rate for the care up to thirty (30) 
days. 
IX. 
On February 6, 2017, the Board entered an Amended Determination of Approval 
for County Assistance, approving the application for dates of service January 26, 2016 through 
February 18, 2016. The Amended Determination of Approval for County Assistance makes no 
reference to dates of service February 19, 2016 through March 9, 2016. It contains no findings 
of fact or conclusions of law concerning such dates of service. 
X. 
The County deems the Amended Determination of Approval for County 
Assistance a final disposition of the entire application. In other words, notwithstanding the 
absence of any findings of fact or conclusions of law or any reference whatsoever to dates of 
service February 19, 2016 through March 9, 2016, the Amended Determination of Approval for 
County Assistance was implicitly a final denial of the application for such dates of service. 
XI. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 31-35050 and 67-5279(3), Petitioner seeks 
review of the Board's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions, which were: (1) in 
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of statutory authority of the 
commissioners; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) not supported by substantial evidence on 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4 Client:4372920.1 
7the record as a whole; or (5) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Specifically, and 
without limiting the foregoing, Petitioner contends that the Board and/or County: (1) erred by 
denying an application for aid in accordance with an erroneous interpretation of the Act that does 
not account for the availability of a lower level of medical care; (2) abused its discretion by 
ignoring undisputed evidence in the record that providers that could provide a lower level of care 
refused or were unable to accept the Patient; (3) made a determination regarding medical 
necessity that is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and is contrary to 
the statutory definition; and (4) failed to make findings and conclusions regarding all dates of 
service that were the subject of the Patient's application. 
XII. 
Petitioner respectfully requests an award of its attorneys' fees and costs pursuant 
to Idaho Code Section 12-117 and any other applicable statutes. 
XIII. 
Petitioner understands that the hearings before the Board regarding the Patient's 
application were recorded by the Clerk of the Gem County Commissioners, and the records of 
the investigation and proceedings have been transcribed and/or are maintained by the Gem 
County Commissioner's Office, 415 East Main, Emmett, Idaho 83617. The Petitioner requests 
that the entire agency record and transcripts currently before the Board, including the documents 
submitted by the Petitioner and/or the Patient for the Board's consideration at or before the 
hearing of February 6, 2017, be submitted to this Court. 
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8Petitioner CERTIFIES: 
A. That the Clerk of the County has been concurrently paid by Petitioner an 
estimate of the costs for the preparation of the agency's transcripts and records pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 84(±)(4); 
B. That the District Court's filing fee applicable to petitions for judicial 
review of a final decision from administrative agencies, including county commissioners, has 
been paid; and 
C. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(b ). 
DATED this 3rd day of March, 2017. 
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By-= ___ ___,;_ ________ _ 
Matthew J. McGee - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Client:4372920.1 
9CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of March, 2017, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW to be served by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Gem County Commissioners 
415 E. Main Street 
Emmett, ID 83617 
Gem County Prosecutor's Office 
306 E. Main Street 
Box 671 
Emmett, ID 83617 
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(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~Facsimile 
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ERICK B. THOMSON 
Gem County Prosecuting Attorney 
TAHJA L. JENSEN, ISB# 8510 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 671 
306 East Main Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: 208-365-2106 
Fax: 208-365-9411 
V 
__ F~' Jr t=Fk ~ 
APR 1 ~ 2017 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF GEM 
ST. LUKES'S HEALTH SYSTEM, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
GEM COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2017-145 
ORDER SETTLING THE AGENCY 
RECORD 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 840), on March 17, 2017, Gem County served upon the parties its 
Notice of Lodgi,ng Agency Record with Agency. On March 20, 2017, Gem County served upon the 
parties its Notice of Lodging Transcript with Agency. Each Notice gave the Petitioner fourteen (14) 
days from the date of each Notice to file any objections to the agency record or the agency 
transcript. There were no objections to the agency record or the agency transcript, both having been 
filed with Gem County pursuant to I.R.C.P. 840). 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that with no objections to the agency 
ORDER SETTLING AGENCY RECORD - Page 1 
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record having been filed, the agency record is deemed settled. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(i), this 
order shall be included in the record on the petition for judicial review. Gem County shall provide 
the Petitioner with a copy of the settled agency record on one (1) DVD. 
DATED this I Y~ day of April, 2017. 
ORDER SETTLING AGENCY RECORD - Page 2 
12
.. 
., 
V 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _____ day of April, 2017, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing upon: 
by: 
Matthew J. McGee 
MOFFAT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, at above address 
hand delivery 
email: mjm@moffatt.com 
Tahja L. Jensen 
Gem County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a medical indigency case. Petitioner St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 
Ltd. ("St. Luke's") appeals the decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Gem County 
(the "County" or "Board") in which the County denied an application for medical indigency 
benefits filed by St. Luke's on behalf of C.H. (the "Patient") under the Medical lndigency Act, 
Idaho Code Section 31-3501, et seq. (the "Act"). 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
On February 25, 2016, St. Luke's submitted a combined application for County 
aid pursuant to Idaho Code Section 31-3501, et seq. (the "Application"), for dates of service 
January 26, 2016, through March 6, 2016. See Agency Record ("AR") at 278-302. The County 
issued an Initial Determination of Approval in Case No. 16-026 on September 19, 2016. AR at 
14. The Initial Determination found the Patient medically indigent, but only approved the 
application for dates of service January 26, 2016, through February 2, 2016. AR at 14. 
St. Luke's appealed the denial on September 29, 2016. AR at 9. 
On February 6, 2017, a hearing was held before the Board regarding its prior 
determination that services provided after February 2, 2016, were not medically necessary. See 
Medical Indigency Hearing - Executive Session, Transcript of Medical Indigency Case 
No. 2016-026 ("Tr.") at 1-5. St. Luke's appeared, inquired regarding the County's medical 
review, and offered evidence, argument, and authority demonstrating that dates of service 
February 3, 2016, through March 9, 2016, were medically necessary. See Tr. at 7-21; AR at 313-
25. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 1 Client:4424510.3 
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On February 6, 2017, the Board issued an Amended Determination of Approval 
for County Assistance. AR at 11-13. The Board approved the Application as to dates of service 
January 26, 2016, through February 18, 2016, but did not approve dates of service February 19, 
2016, through March 9, 2016. AR at 11-13. St. Luke's thereafter timely filed its petition for 
judicial review. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are undisputed. The Patient was treated at St. Luke's for 
meningitis and brain lesions between January 26, 2016, and March 9, 2016, and also received 
additional inpatient care and home health care thereafter at a different facility. Tr. at 4; AR at 
278-86. She is an indigent resident of Gem County. AR at 11-13. Indeed, the County approved 
the Application with respect to certain treatment rendered to the Patient from January 26, 2016, 
through February 18, 2016. Id. 
The Patient was admitted on January 26, 2016, after being found unconscious. 
Tr. at 4. She received emergency treatment. As early as February 5, 2016, St. Luke's began 
assessing the propriety of a lower level of care at a long term acute care hospital ("LT ACH"), 
noting that the Patient's lack of resources would likely be a "barrier for placement." See AR at 
317. On February 16, 2016, St. Luke's contacted Meridian Care regarding placing the Patient in 
a lower level of care, but it would not take the Patient because of her lack of resources. See AR 
at 316. The following day, St. Luke's contacted two additional facilities, which likewise 
declined to admit the Patient because she was self-pay. Id. Another facility declined admission 
until the Patient had a primary care physician that would follow her to the facility. Id. 
On February 22, 2016, St. Luke's contacted two rehabilitation hospitals because 
that was the recommended disposition, and on February 25, 2016, each hospital declined to take 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 2 Client:4424510.3 
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the Patient due to concerns about the Patient's clinical status. See AR at 315. Two additional 
facilities evaluated the Patient beginning on February 25, 2016, and finally, on March 9, 2016, 
the Patient discharged to Life Care Treasure Valley. See AR at 314-15. Before Life Care would 
agree to admit the Patient, however, a single patient agreement was negotiated that required 
St. Luke's to be responsible for the charges incurred at the lower level of care. See Tr. at 1 0; AR 
at 320-25. 
On May 16, 2016, Dr. Dammrose submitted a utilization management review. 
See AR at 24-27. The review determined that the care provided after February 3, 2016, was not 
medically necessary because the medical records had not yet been submitted for that care, so 
there was nothing for Dr. Dammrose to review. See AR at 25. 
On October 24, 2016, after the County submitted additional medical records, 
Dr. Dammrose amended his review, finding that "the additional clinical notes indicate the patient 
was medically stable on 02/12 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care 
inpatient hospital." See AR at 33. 
On November 16, 2016, after the receipt of additional physician's notes, 
Dr. Dammrose again amended his review, finding that the Patient "was medically stable on 
02/19 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care inpatient hospital." Id. 
On February 6, 2017, St. Luke's participated in an appeal hearing regarding the 
denied dates of service. St. Luke's did not, and does not. dispute Dr. Dammrose's opinion that 
the Patient was "medically stable" on or about February 19, 2016, and that treatment at a lower 
level of care. to the extent available, would be appropriate for the Patient from a clinical 
standpoint. St. Luke's presented evidence of its substantial efforts, beginning in early February, 
to locate a more cost-effective medical facility equipped to provide the lower level of 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 3 Client:4424510.3 
19
V 
rehabilitative care required for the Patient. See AR at 313-25; Tr. at 9. Importantly, there is no 
dispute that the Patient could not have been simply discharged home. See AR at 313. Therefore, 
the ability to provide the Patient with care at a lower level facility depended entirely upon the 
willingness of the various equipped facilities to admit the Patient. 
Dr. Dammrose provided only a clinical opinion that a lower level of care was 
appropriate from a clinical standpoint and none of his reports suggest or address that care at such 
a facility was actually available to the Patient. See AR at 24-40. The County did not present any 
evidence suggesting or otherwise even claim that there was more cost-effective care actually 
available to treat the Patient. See Tr. at 3-21. At the close of the hearing, counsel for the County 
acknowledged that St. Luke's had done what it should have done. Nonetheless, without noting 
or even discussing the actual availability of a facility willing to provide a lower level of care, the 
Board amended the dates of service to reflect approval of only January 26, 2016, to February 18, 
2016, upholding denial of the remaining dates of service. See Tr. at 20-21. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the County must find that alternative medical care is available 
before denying an application based on the clinical propriety of such alternative care. 
2. Whether St. Luke's is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 31-3505G, St. Luke's seeks judicial review of the 
final determination of the County on the Patient's Application. When an application for payment 
of medical services based on medical indigency statutes has been denied, the applicant and 
provider are entitled to judicial review under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 
Idaho Code Section 67-5201, et seq. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 4 Client:4424510.3 
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Cnty., 146 Idaho 753,756,203 P.3d 683,686 (2009). An appellant is entitled to relief if the 
County's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions were (I) in violation of statutory or 
constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners; (3) made 
upon unlawful procedure; (4) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(5) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. IDAHO CODE § 67-5279(3). 
On issues of law and statutory interpretation, an appellate court freely reviews the 
interpretation of a statute and its application to the facts. St. Luke's Reg 'l Med. Ctr., Ltd v. Bd. of 
Comm 'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho at 755,203 P.3d at 685. 
As to questions of fact, judicial review of an administrative order is limited to the 
record, and the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative 
agency. Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495, 903 P.2d 84 (1995). Accordingly, "[a] 
finding of fact without any basis in the record [is] clearly erroneous." Dovel v. Dobson, 122 
Idaho 59, 62,831 P.2d 527,530 (1992) (citations omitted). "Also, a finding of fact lacking 
substantial and competent evidence to support it is clearly erroneous." Id. In order to uphold the 
County's decision under the clearly erroneous standard, the Court must conclude that the record 
contains "some reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in support of its position." Idaho 
Cnty. Nursing Home v. Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 933, 940, 821 P.2d 988, 995 
( 1991 ). A reviewing court may reverse the decision of the county if the substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced. IDAHO CODE§ 67-5279. 
V. ARGUMENT 
This case involves a County determination that is inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute, the purpose of the Medical Indigency Act, and clear Idaho Supreme 
Court precedent. The policy of the Act is to "encourage personal responsibility for medical care 
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and to charge counties with the duty to care for individuals that cannot meet this responsibility." 
St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 146 Idaho at 755,203 P.3d at 685. "In construing [Idaho Code 
§ 31-3501, et seq.], this Court has stated that 'the legislature's general intent in enacting the 
medical indigency assistance statutes is twofold: to provide indigents with medical care and to 
allow hospitals to obtain compensation rendered to indigents."' Id. ( quoting Univ. of Utah Hosp. 
v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 808, 810, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156 ( 2007)). For the reasons that follow, the 
County has abused its discretion and committed clear legal error, and its denial of dates of 
service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, should be reversed. 
A. The County's Interpretation of the Definition of Necessary Medical Services 
Is Contrary to the Statute's Plain Language and Purpose. 
1. The plain language of Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) demonstrates 
that the denied dates of service were necessary medical services. 
Dr. Dammrose's clinical opinion was that the dates of service at St. Luke's from 
February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, are not considered medically necessary because "the 
patient was medically stable on 02/19 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an 
acute care inpatient hospital" and "[h]er medical care was at a maintenance level, and her needs 
were rehabilitative in nature." AR at 38. In short, the Patient could not be discharged, but would 
be clinically appropriate to have received care somewhere other than St. Luke's. St. Luke's does 
not dispute that the Patient's status was appropriate for a lower level of care for the service dates 
identified by Dr. Dammrose. However, Dr. Dammrose's clinical opinion about the Patient's 
medical stability does not demonstrate that the statutory requirements of "necessary medical 
services" were not met in this case. The statute at issue provides, in its entirety, as follows: 
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A. "Necessary medical services" means health care services and 
supplies that: 
(a) Health care providers, exercising prudent clinical judgment, 
would provide to a person for the purpose of preventing, 
evaluating, diagnosing or treating an illness, injury, disease or its 
symptoms; 
(b) Are in accordance with generally accepted standards of 
medical practice; 
(c) Are clinically appropriate, in terms of type, frequency, extent, 
site and duration and are considered effective for the covered 
person's illness, injury or disease; 
( d) Are not provided primarily for the convenience of the person, 
physician or other health care provider; and 
(e) Are the most cost-effective service or sequence of services or 
supplies, and at least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or 
diagnostic results for the person's illness, injury or disease. 
B. Necessary medical services shall not include the following: 
(a) Bone marrow transplants; 
(b) Organ transplants; 
(c) Elective, cosmetic and/or experimental procedures; 
( d) Services related to, or provided by, residential, skilled nursing, 
assisted living and/or shelter care facilities; 
(e) Normal, uncomplicated pregnancies, excluding caesarean 
section, and childbirth well-baby care; 
(t) Medicare copayments and deductibles; 
(g) Services provided by, or available to, an applicant from state, 
federal and local health programs; 
(h) Medicaid copayments and deductibles; and 
(i) Drugs, devices or procedures primarily utilized for weight 
reduction and complications directly related to such drugs, devices 
or procedures. 
IDAHOCODE § 31-3502(18). 
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Dr. Dammrose specifically cites Section 31-3502(18)A( e) as the provision 
supporting his opinion that the dates at issue were not medically necessary. See AR at 38. It 
appears that Dr. Dammrose concluded that because it would have been clinically appropriate to 
transfer the Patient to a lower level of care, the service was not the "most cost-effective service 
or sequence of services and at least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or diagnostic 
results for the person's illness, injury or disease." IDAHO CODE § 31-3502(18)A(e). That 
conclusion may be an accurate clinical assessment of the Patient's condition, but does not 
account for all of the pertinent facts. Dr. Dammrose does not dispute that the Patient could not 
be discharged home, and no other more cost-effective facility was willing to receive the Patient 
until March 9, despite significant efforts to transfer the Patient before then. Even on March 9, a 
facility was only willing to admit the Patient upon a financial responsibility taken on by 
St. Luke's. Put simply, St. Luke's was the only facility that could and would provide the 
necessary medical services to the Patient. Logically, the only service or sequence of services is 
the most cost-effective. 
Critically, that conclusion is consistent with the plain language of the statute. It is 
well-established that if statutory language is unambiguous, the legislature's expressed intent 
must be given effect and a court should not engage in statutory interpretation. In re Kootenai 
Hosp. Dist., 149 Idaho 290,293,233 P.3d 1212, 1215 (2010). Accordingly, the plain meaning 
of a statute will prevail unless the clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary to the plain 
meaning or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Id. The statute does not require that 
the necessary medical services would be the most cost-effective services in a hypothetical best 
case scenario regardless of the availability of a facility to provide those services. It requires only 
that the necessary medical services "[ a/re the most cost effective" services in the factual scenario 
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presented to the County. The County abused its discretion by ignoring the undisputed facts 
establishing that the service provided by St. Luke's to the Patient was the only service actually 
available to the Patient. It was clear legal error for the County to simply rely upon 
Dr. Dammrose's clinical assessment that does not account for the lack of availability of care at a 
lower level facility. 
2. The County's interpretation of Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) 
contravenes the purpose of the Medical Indigency Act. 
"[T]he legislature's intent in enacting the medical indigency assistance statutes 
was two-fold: to provide indigents with access to medical care and to allow hospitals to obtain 
compensation for services rendered to indigents." Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 
808, 810, 153 P .3d 1154, 1156 (2007) ( quoting Carpenter v. Twin Falls Cnty., 107 Idaho 575, 
582, 691 P.2d 1190, 1197 (1984)). In this case, the County's interpretation of the requirements 
of Section 31-3502(18) directly conflicts with that purpose. St. Luke's is deprived of the ability 
to obtain compensation for services rendered to the Patient because the Patient achieved a certain 
medical status justifying treatment at a different facility notwithstanding the fact that no other 
facility would admit the Patient. To add insult to injury, not only did the County deny nearly 
three weeks of services St. Luke's provided to the Patient, but St. Luke's also was contractually 
obligated to pay for the Patient's care at Life Care as a condition to transfer the Patient. The 
legislature did not intend such results. 
For example, the legislature recognized the issue of ensuring cost-efficiency and 
saw fit to grant counties the right to "contract with providers, transfer patients, [ and] negotiate 
provider agreements." IDAHO CODE § 31-3503(2). In other words, the County has the statutory 
right to contract with providers to ensure that circumstances such as those that have occurred in 
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this case are minimized or eliminated. After all, multiple providers approached by St. Luke's 
declined to admit because the Patient was self-pay and an applicant under the Act. 
The purpose of the Act is to ensure that providers receive payment for medical 
care provided to indigent residents, and the legislature has provided counties with ample 
authority to ensure that treatment is provided in a cost-effective manner. In this case, the County 
ignored evidence that alternative care was not available and denied nearly three weeks of care. 
Such a result is not only contrary to the plain language of the Act, but is inconsistent with the 
Act's purpose. The Court should reverse the County's decision and remand for approval of dates 
of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016. 
B. Alternative Service Options Must Be "Actually Available" In Order to 
Support Denial. 
1. St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County. 
"Availability" is a touchstone in the medical indigency analysis, and the County 
must account for the availability of the "most cost-effective service" when evaluating medical 
necessity. The Idaho Supreme Court has confirmed that counties must determine "whether 
specific services were actually available" before relying upon or accounting for such services. 
St. Joseph Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Nez Perce Cnty. Comm 'rs, 134 Idaho 486, 490, 5 P .3d 466, 4 70 
(2000) (none of the documentation on which the County based its denial provided any details 
about whether a specific service was available). 
A patient must have access to the "most cost-effective service" in order for that 
service to disqualify the provided service as medically necessary. In this case, although 
St. Luke's does not dispute Dr. Dammrose's opinion that the Patient was stable enough to be 
transferred to a lower level of care, a lower level of care was not available to the Patient. 
Therefore, the services provided by St. Luke's until a transfer was possible were, as a matter of 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 10 Client4424510.3 
26
V V 
fact, the "most cost-effective services." There is no evidence in the record to contradict that 
conclusion. As a medical professsional, Dr. Dammrose's opinion is a clinical opinion that 
addresses hypothetical circumstances without accounting for another provider's willingness to 
admit the indigent patient. 
St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, supra, illustrates that alternative service 
options which may disqualify provided services as "necessary medical services" must be 
"actually available" to an applicant. The following quotation from that case shows that Nez 
Perce County made the very same error the County did in this case, failing to account for the 
"actual availability" of alternative care options: 
The Board also denied B.T. medical indigency status based upon a 
finding that there were other resources available to provide the 
same services to B.T., such as state-supported mental health 
services, through Idaho Mental Health and the state psychiatric 
hospitals, and alcohol treatment through the Port of Hope and 
Roger's Counseling Center. The Board relied on an affidavit and 
supporting documentation from the program manager for Region II 
Mental Health Services, which is a program provided by the State 
of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, Division of Family 
and Community Services. Under I.C. § 31-3502( 18)(B)(g), 
"services ... available to an applicant from state, federal and local 
health programs" are not includable as "necessary medical 
services" for which the indigency statutes provide payment. 
The record reflects that on the first day of service, B.T. was 
homeless, without income and with access to only one week of 
resources. Within a day of her admission, B.T. was interviewed by 
a representative of Idaho Mental Health for referral to a voluntary 
bed at State Hospital North. However, on July 8, 1996, Idaho 
Mental Health advised SJRMC that "Pathgrant Funds ha[d] been 
exhausted until September 1996 and that patient c[ ould] follow up 
with Idaho Mental Health and Chemical Dependency program of 
choice." On July 9, 1996, another entry in B.T. 's hospital record 
indicates "Idaho Mental Health has refused to see patient due to 
diagnosis being drug and alcohol related." Recognizing a 
discharge plan problem in B.T. 's case, SJRMC continued to look 
into housing assistance on her behalf, other available services, and 
treatment referrals. When follow-up treatment was arranged 
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through Roger's Counseling Center in Clarkston, Washington, 
B.T. was discharged from SJRMC. 
Id. at 489-90, 5 P.3d 469-70. 
The district court thereafter "dismantled the Board's finding that other resources 
were available to B.T." and determined that "none of the documentation upon which the Board 
based its decision provided any details as to whether specific services were actually available to 
B.T." Id. (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court's conclusion, 
holding that "only those resources actually available to an applicant can be considered for 
purposes of eligibility for medical indigency benefits." Id. 
Just as in St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, the County has denied dates of 
service based upon theoretical care options at a different facility. Also, just as in St. Joseph 
Regional Medical Center, there was clear evidence demonstrating that the provider pursued 
those alternative care options, but they were not actually available and the Patient was not 
admitted. In fact, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that care at a lower level facility 
was available to the Patient at any time before March 9, 2016. Indeed, the County does not even 
allege the actual availability of a facility willing to provide a lower level of care. The result of 
this case should accord with the holding in St. Joseph Regional Medical Center. The Court 
should reverse the County's denial of dates of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 
2016, on the grounds that care at a lower level facility was not actually available to the Patient. 
2. The law does not allow St. Luke's or the County to transfer a patient 
without the receiving facility's consent. 
The requirement that a receiving facility agree to receive a transferring patient 
before a transfer is made is fundamental in medicine and hospitalization, and cannot simply be 
ignored when evaluating medical necessity and cost-effectiveness. Under the federal Emergency 
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Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd ("EMTALA"), which applies to 
St. Luke's, "[ a ]n appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a transfer ... in which the receiving 
facility (i) has available space and qualified personnel for the treatment of the individual, and 
(ii) has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to provide appropriate medical treatment." 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2). A transfer cannot take place without a willing receiving facility. It 
necessarily follows that the care must be available in order for it to qualify as a potential source 
of more "cost-effective care." Care is only cost-effective if a provider will actually agree to 
provide it. 
The Act contemplates consideration of availability of care. In fact, the foregoing 
provision also applies to the County in the event it exercises its right to have a medically indigent 
person transferred. The County must comply with EMT ALA, including ensuring that the 
receiving facility has agreed to accept transfer, and must ensure that treatment for the necessary 
medical service is available at the facility. See IDAHO CODE§ 31-3507. If the County must 
ensure that care at the receiving facility is "available" to complete a transfer, it must account for 
the availability of service in its assessment of whether the care provided is the most cost-
effective. 
By way of example, if the Patient had already been approved by the County on 
February 19, 2016, it would have had the right to transfer the Patient. It could not have done so, 
however, without locating a receiving facility. The only place where "treatment for the 
necessary medical service [was] available" was St. Luke's, because no other appropriate 
providers were willing to receive the transfer. That fact does not mean that the already-approved 
application should thereafter be denied as to further medical services. It simply means that, in 
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cost-effective service or sequence of services ... for the person's illness, injury or disease." 
The County erred by failing to account for substantial evidence in the record 
illustrating that the Patient's treatment from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, was the most 
cost-effective service available to the Patient because a lower level of care was not available. 
C. St. Luke's Is Entitled to Its Reasonable Attorney Fees. 
St. Luke's requests attorney fees on review pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-117( I), which provides that "the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." IDAHO 
CODE § 12-11 7 ( 1 ). A party acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law when it "has no 
authority to take a particular action." Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 808, 812, 153 
P.3d 1154, 1158(2007)(quotingFischerv. Cityo/Ketchum, 141 Idaho349,356, 109P.3d 1091, 
1098 (2005) ). 
As the foregoing clearly demonstrate_s, the County had no authority or evidence to 
support denial of the dates of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016. Not only does 
the application of undisputed facts to the plain language of the statute demonstrate error, but a 
well-established medical indigency decision by the Idaho Supreme Court directly addresses the 
impropriety of denial based on more cost-effective service options without corresponding 
evidence that such options were "actually available" to a patient. St. Luke's presented ample 
undisputed evidence that the services Dr. Dammrose references were not actually available until 
March 9, 2016. There was no evidence in the record, or even claim by the County, that services 
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at a lower level facility were available to the Patient. The Board's decision had no basis in law 
or fact. Accordingly, St. Luke's respectfully requests an award of costs and attorney fees. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The sole grounds for denial of the Patient's treatment for dates of service 
February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, was the propriety of a lower level of care. While 
St. Luke's does not dispute that care at a lower level facility would have been appropriate, the 
undisputed evidence before the Board demonstrated that care at a lower level facility was not 
actually available to the Patient. The County's denial is not supported by fact or law, and should 
be reversed and remanded for the Board's approval of dates of service February 19, 2016, 
through March 9, 2016. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 2017. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a medical indigency case. Respondent Board of County Commissioners of Gem 
County (the "County") approved the application for medical indigency benefits filed by 
Petitioner St. Luke's Regional Medical Center ("St. Luke's") on behalf of C.H. (the "Patient") 
under the Medical Indigency Act, Idaho Code§ 31-3501, et seq. (the "Act"). St. Luke's now 
appeals dates of services that the County denied because they were not "necessary medical 
services" under the Act. 
B. Procedural History & Factual Summary 
On January 26, 2016, the Patient was found unconscious in her Emmett, Idaho, home and 
was transported via ambulance to Valor Health in Emmett. See Agency Record ("AR") at 19. 
She was started on antibiotics and then transported to St. Luke's Meridian Medical Center 
("SLMMC") that same date. AR at 36. The Patient remained at SLMMC until March 9, 2016, 
when she was discharged to Life Care Center, a rehabilitation center. AR at 37. 
On February 29, 2016, the County received a combined application for County assistance 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 31-3501, et. seq. (the "Application"). AR at 278-302. The County 
issued an Initial Determination of Approval in Gem County Case No. 16-026 on September 19, 
2016. AR at 14-16. The Initial Determination was that the Patient was indigent and approved 
dates of service from January 26, 2016, through February 2, 2016. Jd. 
On September 29, 2016, St. Luke's filed an appeal with the County for the denial of dates 
of service. AR at 9. On October 24, 2016, after submission of additional medical records 
including a summary of care and a treatment plan, Dr. Doug Dammrose, MD and Medical 
Director of Idaho Medical Review, amended his utilization management review and opined: 
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a. 01/26/2016 to 02/12/2016 ED/inpatient stay at SLMMC is considered 
medically necessary and emergent 
The additional clinical notes indicate the patient was medically stable on 
02/12 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care 
inpatient hospital. Her medical care was at a maintenance level, and her 
needs were rehabilitative in nature. The inpatient stay from 02/12/2016 to 
03/09/2016 is considered not medically necessary for purposes of payment 
IC 31-3502(18)A(e)B(d) 
b. Home health services are considered not medically necessary for purposes 
of payment. The services to be provided appear directed towards 
maintenance rather than treatment 
AR at 33. 
On November 16, 2016, after receiving additional medical records, Dr. Dammrose again 
amended his utilization management review, finding that "the additional clinical notes indicate 
the patient was medically stable on 02/19 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an 
acute care inpatient hospital." AR at 38. Dr. Dammrose found that the inpatient stay from 
02/19/2016 to 03/09/2016 was rehabilitative in nature and not medically necessary per Idaho 
Code§ 31-3502(18)A(e)B(d). Jd. 
The appeal was heard by the County on February 6, 2017. See Transcript of Medical 
lndigency Hearing ("TR") at 1. St. Luke's appeared at the hearing and offered notes from a 
discharge planner as to the dates of service February 3, 2016, through March 9, 2016. TR at 7-
21. The County reviewed the latest medical review denying those same dates of service and 
inquired of St. Luke's as to the costs of Patient's inpatient care. TR at 6, 17. Specifically, 
Commissioner Elliot asked, "So during the 20 days that [the Patient] did not need the higher rate 
of care, was that care still administered at that rate and was it billed at that rate?" TR at 17. The 
hospital admitted that there was less care provided but did not offer a reduced rate. Id. 
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On February 6, 2017, the County issued an Amended Determination of Approval for 
County Assistance. AR at 11-13. The County found that the dates of service from January 26, 
2016, through February 18, 2016, were medically necessary and approved payment for those 
dates of service. Id. 
On March 6, 2017, St. Luke's timely filed its petition for judicial review. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was the County is statutorily prohibited from paying for services deemed not 
"necessary medical services?" 
2. Was the County required to consider "available resources" to the hospital absent 
statutory or supporting authority to do so? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Code § 31-3505G provides that: 
If, after a hearing a provided in section 31-3505E, Idaho Code, the final 
determination of the board is to deny an application for financial assistance with 
necessary medical services, the applicant, or a third party making application on 
applicant's behalf, may seek judicial review of the final determination of the board 
in the manner provided in Section 31-15 06, Idaho Code. 
The district court's review is limited to the record. Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho 
495, 496-97, 903 P.2d 84, 85-86 (1995). A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for 
that of the [County] on questions of fact, and will uphold [the County's] finding of fact if 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. A reviewing court may reverse the [County's] 
decision or remand for further proceedings only if substantial rights of the appellant have been 
prejudiced. IDAHO CODE§ 67-5279(4). 
RESPONDENTS'BRIEF 3 
38
V V 
When the [County] was required ... to issue an order, the court shall affirm the [County's 
action] unless the court finds that the [County's] findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions 
are: ( a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory 
authority of the [County]; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg!. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bd. ofCnty Commrs. of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 51, 53, 190 P.3d 
870,872 (2008) (quoting Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)). Determining the meaning of a statute is a 
matter of law. Id. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The County correctly applied Idaho Code§ 31-3502(18) in denying payment 
for dates of service which were not medically necessary. 
It is uncontroverted that the dates of care denied by the County were not the most cost-
effective service. St. Luke's did not, and does not, dispute Dr. Dammrose's opinion that the 
Patient was "medically stable" on or about February 19, 2016, and that treatment at a lower level 
of care would be appropriate from a clinical standpoint. See Petitioner's Brief at 3. 
St. Luke's interpretation of the purpose of the Medical Indigency Act (the "Act") is 
correct in that the legislature sought to not only have medical care provided to indigent residents 
but also to assure that the compensation provided to hospitals allows them to continue providing 
care. See Petitioner's Brief at 9, and Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 808,810, 153 
P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007). However, St. Luke's cannot ignore that the language of the statute 
requires the County to place limitations on what qualifies as necessary medical services. "[T]he 
county medically indigent program and the catastrophic health care cost program are payers of 
last resort. Therefore, applicants or third party applicants seeking financial assistance under the 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 4 
39
V 
county medically indigent program and the catastrophic health care cost program shall be 
subject to the limitations and requirements as set forth herein." IDAHO CODE § 31-3501 (2) 
( emphasis added). 
Only necessary medical services can be approved for payment. Idaho Code § 31-
3502(18) reads: 
A. "Necessary medical services" means health care services and supplies that: 
(a) Health care providers, exercising prudent clinical judgment, would 
provide to a person for the purpose of preventing, evaluating, diagnosing 
or treating an illness, injury, disease or its symptoms; 
(b) Are in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical 
practice; 
(c) Are clinically appropriate, in terms of type, frequency, extent, site and 
duration and are considered effective for the covered person's illness, 
injury or disease; 
( d) Are not provided primarily for the convenience of the person, 
physician or other health care provider; and 
( e) Are the most cost-effective service or sequence of services or supplies, 
and at least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or diagnostic 
results for the person's illness, injury or disease. 
B. Necessary medical services shall not include the following: 
(a) Bone marrow transplants; 
(b) Organ transplants; 
(c) Elective, cosmetic and/or experimental procedures; 
(d) Services related to, or provided by, residential, skilled nursing, 
assisted living and/or shelter care facilities; 
(e) Normal, uncomplicated pregnancies, excluding caesarean section, and 
childbirth well-baby care; 
(f) Medicare copayments and deductibles; 
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(g) Services provided by, or available to, an applicant from state, federal 
and local health programs; 
(h) Medicaid copayments and deductibles; and 
(i) Drugs, devices or procedures primarily utilized for weight 
reduction and complications directly related to such drugs, devices 
or procedures. 
After reviewing medical records on four different occasions, the County's 
medical reviewer, Dr. Dammrose, consistently denied February 19, 2016, through March 
9, 2016, for payment citing that the care was not medically necessary because it was not 
the most cost-effective service. See AR at 38. 
It is worthy of note that Idaho Code§ 31-3502(18)(B) includes what necessary 
medical services "shall not include." St. Luke's has argued from the onset that it tried to 
transfer the Patient to a lower level of care, specifically skilled nursing facilities, since 
February. The services that St. Luke's was seeking were included in the statute's 
services that are not medically necessary. So, even under its own assessment, if the 
Patient was to be transferred as of the date of St. Luke's efforts, those services would not 
be deemed medically necessary under the statute. 
1. The County is not required to consider whether alternative service 
options are actually available to the hospital. 
Nothing in the statute requires or even implies that the county is to consider whether 
alternative service options are actually available to the hospital. Similarly, there is no authority 
for St. Luke's to make that argument. St. Luke's claims that the language of the statute is 
unambiguous. See Petitioner's Brief at 8. If the legislature wanted to require the County to 
consider whether alternative service options are actually available to the hospital, they could 
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have put that in the statute. They did not. Because they did not intend for counties to be held to 
that requirement. 
St. Luke's asserts that it has an "entire group" that is responsible for case management. 
TR at 8. According to the record, they began as early as February 11, 2016, in looking for a 
lower level of care for the patient. Id. The patient was medically ready for discharge on 
February 18, 2016. /d. So according to their records, they spent not just those seven days 
looking for an alternative placement, but it took until March 9 to enter into a third party contract 
with the provider Life Care of Boise, a rehabilitative hospital. TR at 9-10. Such a placement 
could have been, and in fact should have been, entered into in February. A lower level of care 
could have been achieved much sooner and much more cost effectively as reiterated by Dr. 
Dammrose. 
Even ifresources had not been available, it is not the County's responsibility to seek out 
such an arrangement. It is the responsibility of the hospital. This logically follows that the costs 
of failing to do so would also fall upon the hospital. It is inequitable to argue that the hospital 
has the responsibility to transfer a patient but is not responsible for the financial responsibility to 
do so, passing that burden on to the County. One of the primary purposes of the Act is to 
provide the most "cost-effective" services. Applying St. Luke's argument in this case would 
create a system where the hospitals have no financial motivation for lowering a patient's level of 
care in an efficient manner, as they would receive compensation for the higher levels of care 
whether that care was necessary or not. 
2. The County is statutorily obligated to participate in utilization 
management and by statute has no authority to pay for any service that 
utilization management has determined to be "not medically necessary." 
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The County is statutorily obligated to participate in utilization management pursuant to 
the statute. See IDAHO CODE § 31-3503(D). "Every county shall fully participate in the 
utilization management program." Id. That is what the County did in this instant case in sending 
this case for medical review, not once, but on four different occasions. TR at 5. Counties and 
the state catastrophic health care cost program (the "CAT board") rely on such utilization 
management to assure the "efficien[t] use of health care services, procedure and facilities. IDAHO 
CODE § 31-3502(28). Further, Idaho Code § 31-3505B specifically restricts the authority of the 
County to pay for any service that utilization management has determined to be "not medically 
necessary." It reads: 
APPROVAL BY THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. The county 
commissioners shall approve an application for financial assistance if it 
determines that necessary medical services have been or will be provided to 
a medically indigent resident in accordance with this chapter; provided, the 
amount approved when paid, at the reimbursement rate, by the obligated 
county for any medically indigent resident shall not exceed the lesser of: 
(1) The total sum of eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) in the aggregate per 
resident in any consecutive twelve (12) month period; or 
(2) The reimbursement for services recommended by any or all of the 
utilization management activities pursuant to section 31-3502, Idaho Code. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
The County relied on all four of the utilization management reviews conducted by Dr. 
Dammrose, and was correct in doing so. TR at 20-21. The County denied services rendered for 
the Patient from February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, because they were "not medically 
necessary." Id. The statute limited the County's authority to reimburse St. Luke's for those dates 
of service. 
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3. The decision in St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County is 
regarding eligibility for medical indigency, and cannot be interpreted to 
read what resources were available to the hospital. 
The court, in St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County, found that "only 
those resources actually available to [an] ... applicant can be considered in determining the 
applicant's eligibility for assistance." Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board ofCnty 
Comm 'rs, 107 Idaho 248,688 P.2d260 (Ct. App. 1948) quoting Moffett v. Blum, 74 A.D.2d 625, 
424 NYS2d 923, 925 (1980). This can be distinguished from the facts in our case because the 
court used this analysis in determining an applicant's eligibility for assistance, not whether 
resources were available to the hospital. This is where the analysis using this case ends. This 
case does not discuss the utilization of hospital resources and would be incorrectly applied if 
read as St. Luke's hopes it to be. 
B. St. Luke's Analysis of the Statute's Plain Language and Purpose is 
Erroneous. 
1. The plain language of Idaho Code Title 31, Chapter 35 must be read as a 
whole. 
The indigency statute must be read as a whole. Clear Idaho Supreme Court precedent 
outlines that "the words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute 
must be construed as a whole." State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25P.3d 850 (2001). Idaho 
Code Title 31, Chapter 35 requires application oflimitations enumerated therein. St. Luke's 
recitation of the purpose of the act ignores the statute as a whole. 
2. To read that the purpose of Idaho Code Title 31, Chapter 35 is to 
compensate medical providers without limitation leads to an absurd and 
incorrect result. 
In this instant case, St. Luke's provided care to the Patient that is simply not covered 
under "necessary medical services" and the County correctly applied the statute. To suggest that 
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the hospital should be paid to any end was clearly not the legislative intent. Under this analysis, 
the hospital could submit for payment dates of service that were not "medically necessary 
services" without limitation. For example, the hospital could find that no one at a patient's home 
was available to assist with discharge and hold the patient at the acute care rate for a period of 
days. It belies logic that the legislature would codify the limitations of what can be paid under 
the Act, only to have an interpretation that leads to the result St. Luke's seeks-to be paid for 
their decision not to transfer the Patient to a lower level of care at the time that it was 
appropriate. 
In fact the legislature specifically limits the authority of the County to authorize payment 
for services that utilization management determines to be "not medically necessary." See IDAHO 
CODE § 31-3505B. A Board of County Commissioners is charged with the fiscal responsibilities 
of the County and is in no position to conduct medical reviews, which is why the legislature 
requires participation in utilization management. 
C. St. Luke's is Not Entitled to Its Attorney Fees 
St. Luke's asserts that the County had no authority or evidence to support denial of the 
dates of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, and as such requests an award of 
attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. 
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) provides that "the court shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorneys' fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The County correctly 
determined that the dates of service were not medically necessary per statute and should prevail. 
St. Luke's request for attorneys fees assumes that its reading of St. Joseph Regional 
Medical Center v. Nez Perce County is correct and that the County ignored Idaho Supreme Court 
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precedent. Both of St. Luke's assumptions are erroneous. The County's interpretation of Idaho 
Code § 31-3502(18), which has not previously been construed by the courts, is reasonable. See 
City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,909,277 P.3d 353,356 (2012) (explaining that "a 
governmental agency does not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law when its 
interpretation of a statute that has not been previously construed by the courts" is not 
unreasonable.). In this case, this precise issue has not previously been litigated. Using the 
Osborn standard, St. Luke's is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
St. Luke's kept the Patient in its acute care facility for twenty (20) days beyond the point 
where the Patient no longer required that level of care. The County correctly applied Idaho Code 
§ 31-3502(18) in denying payment for dates of service which were not medically necessary. The 
County had no authority to pay for any service that utilization management determined to be 
"not medically necessary." St. Luke's assertion that the services must actually be available is 
without merit or support and belies the plain language and purpose of the Medical Indigency Act. 
The County's denial should be affirmed . 
. 1'.kv 
DATED this~ day of June, 2017. 
GEM COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
By: ~~a L. J ~n, ISB #8510 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The County has denied dates of service February 19, 2016 through March 9, 2016 
because Dr. Dammrose, a medical expert expressed a clinical opinion that the Patient could have 
received a lower level of care at a certain point. The County has interpreted Idaho law as not 
requiring any consideration as to the availability of such lower level of care. It is the purview of 
this Court to interpret Idaho law. Existing precedent, as well as the plain language of the statute, 
support reversal of the County's decision in this case. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Services Provided Were the Most Cost-Effective Services. 
The County begins its argument by asserting that "[i]t is uncontroverted that the 
dates of care denied by the County were not the most cost-effective service." See Resp. Br. at 4. 
That assertion fundamentally misstates the issue before the Court, and is also incorrect. The care 
denied by the County was the most cost-effective service because it is uncontroverted that such 
service was the only service actually available to the Patient. 
Dr. Dammrose opines that the Patient reached a level of clinical stability such that 
she could have received a lower level of care. The County points out that St. Luke's does not 
dispute that fact. But Dr. Dammrose does not directly address in his clinical opinion whether a 
lower level of care was actually available to the Patient, although there are references throughout 
the report to various facilities that refused transfer. See AR at 36-38. That was not his role. The 
gathering and presentation of that type of evidence was, in this instance, the role of the parties-
the Patient, the provider, and the County Clerk. The County cannot point to any statement or 
opinion by Dr. Dammrose that there was a lower-level provider that would actually accept 
transfer of the Patient. Indeed, in this case, the only evidence in the record before the Court 
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demonstrates, without qualification, that a lower level of care was not available to the Patient. 
See Petitioner's Brief at 2-4. 
The County proceeds with the argument by asserting that "the County's medical 
reviewer, Dr. Dammrose, consistently denied February 19, 2016 through March 9, 2016, for 
payment citing that the care was not medically necessary because it was not the most cost-
effective service." See Resp. Br. at 6 (emphasis added). The County mischaracterizes the state 
of the record. 
1. Dr. Dammrose is not authorized to deny senrices. 
First, Dr. Dammrose did not deny any services. Dr. Dammrose does not have the 
legal authority to deny an application for aid; that authority belongs to the county 
commissioners. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE§ 31-3505C(l) (" ... the county commissioners shall 
make an initial determination to approve or deny an application ... ") ( emphasis added). The 
County implicitly suggests that, pursuant to utilization management and Idaho Code Section 
3 l-3505B(2), the Commissioners do not have the ability to make findings and draw conclusions 
regarding medical necessity independent of medical review. See Resp. Br. at 8. That is not what 
Idaho Code Section 3 l-3505B(2) stands for. In fact, that statute plainly states that utilization 
management activities result in recommendations to the County and the CAT Board, not 
findings, conclusions or denials. See id. 
2. Dr. Dammrose is not a legal expert. 
Second. Dr. Dammrose offered his clinical opinion about the services at issue 
based on medical facts, and to the extent he offered a legal opinion about the Medical lndigency 
Act, such a statement is entitled to no greater weight than any other witness, attorney, or 
commissioner. Specifically, he determined that "the patient was medically stable on 02/19 and it 
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appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care hospital" and that "[h ]er medical care 
was at maintenance level, and her needs were rehabilitative in nature." AR at 38. St. Luke's 
does not dispute those clinical opinions. St. Luke's takes issue with the legal conclusion that 
follows, wherein Dr. Dammrose steps beyond his qualifications as a medical reviewer and 
interprets and applies Idaho law. He cites the statutory definition of "necessary medical 
services" and concludes that the treatment at issue "is considered not medically necessary for 
purposes of payment." AR at 38. As the County notes, he draws that conclusion "because it was 
not the most cost effective service." Resp. Br. at 6. 
Dr. Dammrose's conclusion in that regard, while potentially true as a clinical 
matter, finds no support in the factual record the Commissioners were charged with reviewing. 
When there is no available alternative service, the service provided is de facto the most cost-
effective service. Furthermore, Dr. Dammrose is not qualified as a legal expert. He notes 
throughout his report the various facilities that declined to admit the Patient. See AR at 37. 
Because he is not a legal expert, or in any way responsible to interpret and apply Idaho law, 
Dr. Dammrose is apparently unfamiliar with St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce 
County Commissioners, 134 Idaho 486, 5 P.3d 466 (2000), which case affirmed that alternative 
services must actually be available in order to find that the services provided were not medically 
necessary. The County clearly erred by abdicating to Dr. Dammrose its duty to draw the 
necessary factual and legal conclusions relating to whether the services at issue were "necessary 
medical services." 
This is not the first time that Dr. Dammrose's role as a medical reviewer issuing a 
legal opinion has resulted in a failure by commissioners to appropriately act as fact finders in an 
adjudicative setting. In a recent case in Twin Falls County, the district court was presented with 
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similar circumstances-a county's erroneous deference to and reliance upon the legal opinion of 
Dr. Dammrose about the statutory definition of "emergency services." See In re Medical 
lndigency Application of MS., Twin Falls County Case No. CV42-15-2357 (Dec. 14, 2015), 
attached hereto as Appendix 1. In that case, Dr. Dammrose applied his clinical opinion about the 
patient's care to that definition, concluding that several dates of service did not qualify as 
"emergency services." On appeal, the district court stated as follows regarding the Board's 
conclusion: 
The Board essentially relied upon the testimony of Dr. Dammrose. 
It appears to this court that Dr. Dammrose was not rendering an 
expert medical opinion as much as he was rendering a legal 
opm1on. 
See id. at 5, n.3. 
The Court thereafter engaged in statutory construction, and concluded that 
Dr. Dammrose's legal opinion, adopted by the county, was in error. Put simply, the Court 
afforded the county, and in tum Dr. Dammrose, the appropriate deference as to his clinical 
opinions, but found that the county's reliance upon his legal opinion interpreting the definition of 
"emergency services" was not entitled to deference or weight, and also determined that the 
county erred in its reliance upon that legal opinion. This case warrants the same result. 
Dr. Dammrose is not the finder of fact, nor is he imbued with the authority to apply the law. The 
Commissioners are. Dr. Dammrose is a paid expert. The Commissioners' abdication of their 
role in favor of Dr. Dammrose's mistaken legal opinion constitutes an abuse of discretion, and 
clear legal error. 
B. The County's Reference to Skilled Nursing Facilities Is a Red Herring. 
In order to support the denial of the treatment dates at issue, the County also 
references Section 31-3502(18)(8), the secondary subpart of the definition of"necessary medical 
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services" that delineates those items that are not "necessary medical services." Specifically, the 
County appears to reference the statute's prohibition of"[ s ]ervices related to, or provided by ... 
skilled nursing facilities." IDAHO CODE§ 3 l-3502(18)(B)(d). This provision does not constitute 
grounds for denial of the dates of service at issue. First, the treatment at issue was neither related 
to, nor provided by, a skilled nursing facility. The treatment at issue was provided by St. Luke's, 
an acute care hospital. Each of the facilities explored by St. Luke's declined to accept the 
Patient. Second, Dr. Dammrose's opinion does not indicate that a skilled nursing facility would 
be sufficient for the Patient. His opinion merely references the fact that "she no longer needed 
the services of an acute care inpatient hospital." Even if the statutory prohibition of services 
provided by a skilled nursing facility applied to St. Luke's, there is not sufficient evidence in the 
record to demonstrate that such prohibition applied in this case. 
C. The County Is Required to Consider Whether Alternative Service Options 
Are Actually Available. 
The County argues that it is not required to consider whether alternative service 
options are actually available to the hospital. See Resp. Br. at 6-7. It remains unclear why the 
County framed the argument in such a manner, but this is simply another way of stating its 
position that the County is not required to consider whether alternative service options are 
actually available to the Patient. As the St. Joseph case very plainly holds, the County is indeed 
required to consider the availability of alternative service options if it intends to deny services 
based on such options. 134 Idaho at 490, 5 P .3d at 4 70. 
The County gives short shrift to the St. Joseph case, see Resp. Br. at 9, and for 
good reason, as it is clearly not helpful to its position. The case is directly on point, and plainly 
reveals the County's error. Although the attempt to distinguish St. Joseph is a bit unclear, it 
seems to suggest that the distinction relates to an evaluation of an applicant's eligibility for 
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assistance, as opposed to resources available to a hospital. Again, the attempt to re-frame the 
issue with the hospital as the purveyor of some unsubstantiated case management error is entirely 
without support in the record-evidenced by a complete lack of any record citation. The 
question is not whether a lower level of care was available to St. Luke's; it is whether a lower 
level of care was available to the Patient. 
In St. Joseph, the county denied an application because it found that the patient 
could have received care at a state psychiatric facility, and alcohol treatment through Port of 
Hope and Roger's Counseling Center rather than the acute care hospital. Relying upon the 
affidavit testimony of a state mental health program manager to that effect, the county applied 
that clinical assessment to the definition of "necessary medical services." However, the factual 
record reflects that a voluntary bed at the state psychiatric facility was not available to the 
patient, and that as soon as follow-up treatment could be arranged through Roger's Counseling 
Center, the patient was discharged. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court's 
conclusion on appeal that the county's denial was legal error because the commissioners failed to 
consider whether these other care options were actually available to the patient. 
In this case, the County denied the application because it found that the Patient 
could have received a lower level of care, relying entirely upon the report of Dr. Dammrose. The 
factual record also discloses, however, that no other facility would accept the Patient during the 
time period in question. A lower level of care was not available to the Patient during that time 
period, and the Patient was transferred as soon as a lower level of care became available, and 
only upon St. Luke's agreement to pay the Patient's obligation to that facility. Just as in 
St. Joseph, the County's failure to consider whether other care options were actually available to 
the Patient was clear legal error. 
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The County cannot convincingly distinguish the facts of this case from the facts in 
St. Joseph. That case demands a finding by this Court that the County has abused its discretion 
by failing to consider the availability of alternative treatment options, and St. Luke's respectfully 
requests the same. 
D. The County's Inflammatory Representation of the Record Should Be 
Ignored. 
Furthermore, and to ensure there is no mistake about what the record reflects, the 
County's assertion that placement in a rehabilitation facility "could have been, and in fact should 
have been entered into in February" is wholly without support. See Resp. Br. at 7. Another 
example of the County's loose explanation of the record is located at page I 0, where it asserts 
that St. Luke's "seeks to be paid for their decision not to transfer the Patient to a lower level of 
care at the time it was appropriate." See Resp. Br. at 10 (emphasis added). The County does not 
cite any evidence for those bald and inflammatory assertions because none exists. Those 
statements constitute misrepresentation, and the lack of any record citation illustrates as much. 
As discussed in detail in the opening brief, and reflected in the record, numerous facilities 
declined to accept the Patient when St. Luke's attempted transfer the Patient. It was not a 
decision by St. Luke's not to transfer the Patient. The only evidence in the record reflects that 
the Patient was discharged as soon as St. Luke's located a facility that would accept the Patient. 
That date was March 9. The Court should not countenance the County's effort to manufacture 
the suggestion that St. Luke's somehow chose to hold on to the indigent patient for some 
financial motivation. This notion should be readily dismissed by the Court. 
E. This Case Does Not Meet the Legislative Limitations Cited by the County. 
Finally, the County's attempted reduction of St. Luke's argument to the absurd is 
unavailing. See Resp. Br. at 9-10. St. Luke's does not "suggest that the hospital should be paid 
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to any end." Id. The hospital could not "find that no one at a patient's home was available to 
assist with discharge and hold the Patient at the acute care rate for a period of days." Id. at 10. If 
the Patient was appropriate to be discharged home, holding the Patient for additional days would 
be "primarily for the convenience of the person, physician or other health care provider," and 
would not be a necessary medical service. See IDAHO CODE § 31-3502(18)(A)( d). The 
limitations are indeed codified, as the County asserts and as the foregoing illustrates, but the 
facts and circumstances of this case do not fall within the confines of the statutory limitations. 
For that reason, the Court should reverse the County's denial of the application for dates of 
service February 19, 2016 through March 9, 2016. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the opening brief, 
St. Luke's respectfully requests that the Court reverse the County's denial of dates of service 
February 19, 2016 through March 9, 2016, and award St. Luke's its reasonable attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117. While St. Luke's does not dispute that care at a lower 
level facility would have been appropriate, the undisputed evidence before the Board 
demonstrated that care at a lower level facility was not actually available to the Patient. 
DA TED this 6th day of July, 2017. 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF - 9 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By ___________ _ 
Matthew J. McGee - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of July, 2017, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Gem County Prosecutor's Office 
306 E. Main Street 
P.O. Box 671 
Emmett, ID 83617 
Facsimile (208) 365-9411 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF - 10 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
()CJ Overnight Mail 
{ ) Facsimile 
Matthew J. McGee 
Client:4459516.1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFfH JUDICIAL DISTRI~HE 
·- :. . . . . . :,£~;, ·. 
-STATE OF IDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWINF.AL'J!S 
IN RE: MEDICAL INDIGENCY 
APPLICATION OF MS. 
ST. LUKE'S HEALTH SYSTEM, 
LTD., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF 
TWIN FALLS-COUNTY, IDAHO~ in 
their' offical capacity as the Board of 
County Commissioners for the County 
of Twin Falls, State ofldabo, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) CaseN~. CV42-15-2357 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)' 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______ Re____.sp,_o_nde_nt __ ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The Petition ·for Judicial Review in the above entitled matter came on regularly for oral 
argument on December 7, 2015. The Petitioner was represented by Counsel; Mark C. Peterson 
and the Respondent was represented by Twin Falls County Deputy Prosecutor, Melissa J. 
Kippes. 
The Court having reviewed the Agency Record and having considered the briefs and 
arguments of counsel took the matter under advisement for a written decision. 
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I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 23, 2014 a 32 year old male, M.S. (patient) was transported by EMS to the 
St Luke's Regional Medical Center emergency department as a result of coughing up blood. The 
patient was admitted to the hospital on November 23, 2014 and was diagnosed with "Bulla of 
lung/Hemoptysis/Destroyed left lung secondary to prior tuberculosis infection . ., The patient was 
treated at the hospital and then discharged from the hospital on November 25, 2014 with a 
planned follow-up with a physician in Boise. 
On December 1, 2014 the patient was then seen for the follow-up by Matthew W. 
Schoolfiel~ M.D. a cardiothoracic and vascular surgeon. Dr. Schoolfield determined that the 
patient was in need of "urgent surgery for his destroyed lung". The patient un~rwent the surgery 
recomm~ by Dr. Schoolfield on December 2, 2014 and was then discharged on December 9, 
2014. 
Within 31 days of the patient's date of admission [November 23, 2014] to St. Luke's an 
Emergency 31-Day Combined · Application for State and County Medical · Assistance 
(Application) was· prepared by the Petitioner and the patient. The Application covered the 
medical services provided for the periods of November 23-25, 2014 and December 1-9, 2014. 
The Application was submitted to the Department of Health and Welfare on December 17, 2014 
for a Medicaid Eligibility Detennination. On January 6, 2015 the .Department of Health and 
Welfare determined that the patient was not eligible for Medicaid and the Application was then 
received by the Respondent on January 7, 2015. 
After receipt of the Application the Respondent on January 28, 2015 conducted a patient 
interview and then sent the case out for a "medical review due to the large dollar amowif'. After 
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conducting the investigation and review of the case the Respondent determined that the patient 
was (1) indigent; (2) that the services were medically necessary and (3) that only the medical 
services provided on November 23-25, 2014 were "emergent". The Respondent determined that 
the medical services provided between December 1-9,.2014 while they were medically necessary 
they were not "emergent" and that the Application was untimely as to the December medical 
services. The Respondent took the position that the petitioner after November 25, 2014 was 
required to file a ''Non-Emergency 10-Day Prior" Application for the December medical services 
provided by the p_etitioner. 
On February 24, 2015 the Respondent issued its Initial Determination approving the 
medical services for November but denying the medical services for December based. on the 
untimeliness of the Application. On March 20, 2015 the petitioner appealed the Initial 
Determination of the denial of the December medical services. 
The Respondent's Board of Commissioners (Board) conducted a hearing on the appeal. 
The Board heard testimony and received exhibits.1 The Petitioner essentially relied upon the 
opinions expressed fo the letters from Dr. Scho_olfield, dated December 1, 2014 and April 6, 
2015 that the December, 2014 medical services should be covered under the emergency 
application. The Respondent in the hearing also heard and considered the testimony of Dr. 
Dammrose who conducted a review of the medical records. Dr. Dammrose testified that he was 
"charged with ... applying the statute and the definitions of ·emergent, ... , in the statute as it 
relates to the clinical care delivered, ... " (Tr. pg. 14, IA-11) Dr. Dammrose admitted he was not 
an expert in lung surgery and he would defer to Dr. Schoofield as to the immediacy of the need 
for lung surgery. (Tr. pg. 14, L. 16-21) In fact in his testimony Dr. Dammrose admitted and 
1 The agency record before this court is not clear as to whether the record consists of all of the medical records 
considered by the Board, for pmposes of judicial review this court is of the. view that the record review conducted by 
Dr. Dammrose and the letters from Dr. Schoolfield present an adequate record for the issue on judicial review. 
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agreed that the patient's lung surgery cc ••• was medically necessary". (Tr. pg. 14, L. 12-15). 
Overall, while Dr. Dammrose acknowledged there was a risk in delaying surgery, it was his 
opinion that there was time to notify the County of the anticipated surgery after the November 25 
discharge and that " ••• the timing of the surgery was really the issue. It was not clearly emergent 
because if it had been emergent, it should have been done on Eleven Twenty-five." (Tr. pg. 18, 
L. 1-8). The testimony of Dr. Dammrose can be summarized to indicate that it was his opinion 
that while the surgery was medically necessary, it was not an emergency since the patient was 
discharged in a stable condition on November 25, 2014 and did not seek follow up treatment 
until 6 days later on December 1, 2014 and did not have surgery until December 2, 2014. 2 
On the other hm:id Dr. Schoolfield on December 1, 2014 opined that surgery was· urgent 
for the reason that there was "no active infection"; that the patient was a "high risk · for 
developing recurrent infection"; and if surgery were conducted during an "active infection,, the 
"risk of complications are increased including infection, fistula and death." Dr. Schoolfield in his 
letter of April 6, 2015 further explained his opinion. He noted that with patients similar to M.S. 
that the " .•. clock is always ticking ... when they present with symptoms because of the high 
rt:eurrence rate of symptoms in the setting of destroyed lung and the strict adherence to ·basic 
princip~es to offer the patient as low a risk of surgery as possible .•.. •t, He further opined that 
-delaying surgery would in his opinion be inappropriate because it would put the patient " .•• in 
danger of massive airway bleeding, risk of his airway becoming actively infected or him 
becoming less compliant with his antibiotic regimen and thereby increasing progressing his 
airway infection." 
2 Dr. Dammroso in his medical record review report, acknowledged that when the patient was discharged on 
November 25, 2014 that a follow up with a surgeon in Boise and surgery were anticipated. 
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At the conclusion of the hearing the Board issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order Denying Application. The Board's Findings of Fact are summarized as follows: 
l. The 31 day application for emergency necessary medical services with the 
Medicaid denial was received by the respondent on January 8, 2015; 
2. The application requested payment for the service dates of November 23-25, 
2014 and December 1-9, 2014 for Bulla of lung, Hemoptysis, destroyed left 
lung secondary to prior tuberculosis infection; 
3. That the patient was indigent and a resident; 
4. That the November services were necessary and emergent; 
5. That the December services were non-emergent and the 31 day application 
was untimely as to the December services; 
6. A timely appeal was filed on March 20, 201S; 
7. The Board conducted a hearing-on May 20, 2015; 
8~ St. Luke's offered a letter from Dr. Schoolfield explaining the December 
services; 
9. That Dr. Dammrose offered testimony and his opinion that the December 
services were non-emergent but agreeing with Dr. Schoolfield ''that continued 
delay of surgery performed on the December dates does present risk." 
10. That the patient was medically stable on December 1 & 2, 2014. 
The Board in its Conclusion of Law found that the patient was a resident and was 
medically indigent. The Board went on to conclude that "ffjhe December services appear to be 
related to the November emergency room visit but, do not qualify as "emergency services" as 
defined ~Y Idaho Code § 31-3502(12). The December services were not provided in response to 
a sudden serious and unexpected symptom requiring immediate medical attention. ,,3 The Board 
concluded that the December services could not be included in the 31 day emergency application 
and that St Luke's was required to file a 10 day non-emergent application for the Pecember 
services. 
The Petitioner has filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review. 
n. 
STANDARD ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
3 The Board essentially relied upon the testhnony of Dr. Dammroae. It appears to this court that Dr. Dammrose was 
not rendering an expert medical opinion as much as he was rendering a legal opinion. 
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A review of matters pertaining to the granting or denying applications for indigency 
benefits is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act. I.C. § 67-5201 et seq.; J.C. § 31-
1506; Sacred Heart Medical Center v. Kootenai County Comm'rs., 136 ldaho 787, 41 P.3d 215 
(2001). "A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency 
on questions of fact, and will uphold an agency's findings of fact if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence,,, Shobe v. Ada County Bd ofComm'rs, 130 Idaho 580,583,944 P.2d 715, 
718 (1997) (quoting Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495,903 P.2d 84 (1995)). 
A reviewing court should affirm the county's decision unless it determines that such 
decision is (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory 
authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 
67-5279(3); St. Alphonsus Reg. Med Ctr. v. Bd of County Commrs. of Ada County, 146 Idaho 
-51, 53, 190 P.3d 870, 872 (2008); Bonner Gen. Hosp. v. Bonner County, 133 Idaho 7,981 P.2d 
242 (1999). Only ifit is shown that an applicant's substantial rights have been prejudiced may a 
· reviewing court reverse a board's decision or remand for further proceedings. Sacred Heart 
Medical Center, 136 Idaho 787, 41 P.3d 215 (2001); Shobe, ~30 Idaho 580, 944 P.2d ?15 (1997). 
m. 
ANALYSIS 
The issue on judicial review is whether the petitioner's filing of the 31-day Application 
for Emergency Medical Services on December 17, 2014 under Idaho Code section 31-3505(3) 
·was sufficient to cover the medical services provided for the periods of November 23-25, 2014 
and December 1-9, 2014. The p~es do not dispute that the patient was admitted to petitioner's 
hospital on November 23, 2014 and that he was hospitalized until November 25, 2014 due to a 
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medical condition which was diagnosed as "Bulla of lung/Hemoptysis/Destroyed left lung 
secondary to prior tuberculosis infection". The parties also do not dispute that at the time the 
patient presented himself on November 23, 2014 and at the time he was admitted to the hospital 
that his medical condition was such that he was in need of "emergency services". The parties 
also do not dispute that the patient's condition was stabilized and that he was discharged on 
·November 25, 2014 with instructions to follow-up with a thoracic surgeon in Boise and that at 
the time of discharge surgery was anticipated. There is no dispute that the patient saw the 
thoracic surgeon in Boise on December 1, 2014 and that the surgeon scheduled surgery. for 
December 2, 2014. The surgery was perfonned on December 2 as scheduled and the patient was 
hospitalw.ed until he was discharged on December 9, 2014. The petitioner argues that the 
December medical services are within the umbrella of the definition of "emergency services,, 
base4 on the opinion of the thoracic surgeon, Dr. Schoolfield. The Respondent argues that once 
the patient was discharged from the hospital on November 25, 2014, there was no longer a need 
for emergency services and the petitioner was required to file the 10 day nonemergency 
application. 
A. Legislative Polley 
Our courts have often recognized and stated the legislative policy behind Title 31, 
Chapter 35 which "is to encourage personal .responsibility for medical care and to charge 
counties with the duty to care for individuals that cannot meet this responsibility" and that the 
"legislature's general intent" behind Chapter 35, "is twofold: to provide indigents with medical 
care and to allow hospitals to obtain compensation for services rendered to indigents." Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159 Idaho 84, 356 P.3d 377, 379 
(2015). 
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Idaho Code section 31 -3505 governs the time and manner of filing application for 
financial assistance with the counties. This section sets forth different time standards depending 
on whether the medical services were provided on an emergency or nonemergency basis.4 
In the case of "emergency services" an application for medical services when the patient 
was not hospitalized must be filed "within thirty-one (31) days beginning with the first day of the 
provision of necessary medical services" and in the case where the patient was hospitalized the 
application for medical services must be filed ''within thirty-0ne {31) days of the date of 
admission.". I.C. § 31-3505(2), (3).5 h is clear that a patient does not necessarily have to be 
''hospitalized" to qualify for emergency medical services. 
When a proper and timely application for financial assistance has been filed, the 
" ..• county commissioners shall approve an application for financial· assistance if it determines 
that necessary medical services have been . • • provided to a medically indigent ~sident in 
accordance with this chapter; ... '' I.C. § 31-3505B. Therefore, if a patient is indigent and a 
resident of the county and has timely filed an application for assistance, the county is obligated 
to pay for the "necessary medical services" provided. Pursuant to I.C. § 31-3502 (18)A, the 
phrase "necessary medical services" is defined as follows: 
(18) A. ''Necessary medical services" means health care services and supplies that: 
(a} Health care providers, exercising prudent clinical judgment, would provide to a 
person for the purpose of preventing, evaluating, diagnosing or treating an illness, injury, 
disease or its symptoms; 
(b) Are in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice; 
(c) Are clinically appropriate, in te.rms of type, frequency, extent, site and duration and 
are considered effective for the covered person's illness, injury or disease; 
( d) Are not provided primarily for the convenience of the person, physician or other 
health care provider; and 
4 An ''application for nonemergency necessary medical services" must be filed "ten (10) days prior to receiving 
services" and that "[R]equests for additional treabnent related to an original diagnosis in accordance with a 
prenpproved treatment plan shall be filed ten (10) days prior to receiving services. I.C. § 31-350S (1), (4). 
., In the event of the need fur emergency services, there is obviously no preapproved treatment plan. 
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( e) Are the most cost-effective service or sequence of services or supplies, and at least as 
-likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or diagnostic results for the person's illness, 
injury or disease. 
TI1erefore as to what constitutes "necessary medical services" is dependent on the nature 
of the medical condition; the accepted medical standards for the effective treatment of such a 
condition; the need for such treatment as opposed to mere convenience; and the most cost-
effective method of treatment to achieve a positive outcome for the patient. 
B. Did the Board err when it concluded that the December medical services 
required the filing of a 10 Day Non-Emergency_ Application? 
On December 17, 2014 the petitioner filed its 31-Day Emergency .Application for 
financial ass~stance · which covered the November and Decem.1;,er medical services provided by 
the petitioner to M.S. and there is no dispute in-the record that the application was filed within 31 
days of the first hospitalization and that M.S. was a resident and indigent. There also is no 
.disp~ between both Dr. Dammrose and Dr. Schoolfield that the services provided to M.S. by 
the· petitioner were "necessary medical services0 and that all (?f the services provided were 
directly related to _ the original diagnosis made on November 23, 2014 when M.S. was first 
admitted to petitioner's hospital. 
The. issue in dispute concerns the interpretation of the definition of "emergency services,, 
and the facts of this case. LC.§ 31-3S02(12). The term at issue is defined as follows: 
(12) "Emergency service,, means a service provi~ for a medical condition in which 
sudden, serious and unexpected symptoms of illness or injury are sufficiently severe to 
necessitate or call for immediate medical care, including. but not limited to, severe pain, 
that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected· by a 
· prudent person who possesses an avemge knowledge of health and medicine. to result in: 
(a) Placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy; 
(b) Serious impairment to bodily functions; or 
(c) Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. 
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The definition mentioned above was adopted by the legislature as part of its 2009 amendments to 
Title ) 1, Chapter 35. Prior to the adoption of this amendment to the definition of "emergency 
services" our courts had found that the definition was not ambiguous. Sacred Heart Medical 
Center v. Nez Perce County Commissioner:'/, 138 Idaho 215,216, 61 P.3d 572, 573 (2002); St. 
Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County Commissioners, 134 Idaho 486, 5 P.3d 
466 (2000). 6 
The interpretation of a statute is a question oflaw .... State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424, 
426, 50 P .3d 439, 441 (2002). The object of statutory interpretation is to derive legislative 
intenl State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011). Interpretation of a 
statute begins with the statute's literal words. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 
P.2d 214,219 (1999). The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. Id The Court must give effect to all the 
words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. 
Id When the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must give effect· to the 
legislature's clearly expressed intent without engaging in statutory construction. State v. 
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1999). 
Saint Alpho11SUS Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159 Idaho 84,356 P.3d at 
379-380. 
While the definition of "emergency services,, has been amended, since the court 
decisions finding it to be unambiguous, the definition as amended remains unambiguous. The 
definition focuses on the "medical condition" and whether the condition is such as to req~e · 
"inun~ate medical care''. To assist in this determination of the need for immediate care the 
legislature bas added language to the effect if a pe~on of "average knowledge of health and 
medicine', would expect that the "absence of immediate medical attention•• would cause the 
patient serious jeopardy, impairment or dysfunction of the health, body or organs of the patient 
In St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce County Com 'rs, supra. the Court 
found that a woman's belief that radio waves controlled her actions called for immediate 
6 The term "emergency services" was prevlously defmed to mean ''a service provided for a medical condition in 
which sudden, serious and unexpected symptoms of illness or injury are sufficiently severe to necessitate or call for 
immediate medical care." 
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hospitalization-rendering treatment epiergent-rather than deferring admission for ten days or 
directing her to seek outpatient treatment because the treating physician testified that he "had no 
way of knowing whether [she] would have died from her psychosis had she left the hospital and 
not been admitted." 134 Idaho 486,471, 5 P.3d 466,491 (2000). The testimony provided by the 
treating physician was not rebutted by the County's expert. Id, 5 P.3d at 491. The Court 
concluded that the patient's application for indigency benefits for emergency medical services 
was timely filed because "she clearly was in need of treatment for a psychotic condition that had 
nev~r been diagnosed and had never been treated before, making her situation an emergent 
condition." Id., 5 P .3d at 491. Thus the court focused on whether immediate treatment was "more 
appropriate" than deferring · medical action for 10 days in order to allow a non-emergent 
application absent rebuttal testimony as to such professional detennination by an expert. 
The decision in St. Joseph does not address the issue before this court based on the fucts 
of this case since it does concern a situation where the patient is admitted on an emergency basis, 
is stabil~ and then released from the hospital with follow up treatment or surgery that occurs 
within the 31 days to file an emergency application. However, in the case of M.S., the opinions 
expressed by Dr. Schoolfield demonstrate from a medical standpoint as to why the surgery on 
December 2, 2014 was emergent, given the high risk of a recurrent infection and the associated 
complications, including death. Dr. Dammrose, on the other hand, while acknowledging the 
possibility of increased risk to the patient, seems to suggest that any delay in treatment or surgery 
takes the patient out of the definition of "emergency medical services" based on his 
interpretation of I.C. §. 31-3502(12) and not based on his medical opinion as a medical doctor. 
The only other case dealing with definition of emergency medical services is Sacred 
Heart Medical Center v. Nez Perce County Com 7S, supra. The court found as ''reasonablen the 
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Nez Perce County Commissioners' factual finding that Sacred Heart had not provided 
"immediate medical care,. after considering the chronology of events leading up to the patient's 
surgery at Sacred Heart. Id, 138 Idaho 215, 217, 61 P.3d 572, 574 (2002). The court noted: (1) 
the patient first heard of needing gallbladder surgery in July 1998 and received surgery the same 
month in Lewiston, Idaho; (2) the Lewiston surgeon referred the patient to the Rockwood Clinic 
in Spokane, Washington which referred the patient to Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane 
where she consulted with Dr. Holbrook on August 18, 1998; (3) during the August 18, 1998 
consultation Dr. Holbrook set exploratory surgery sixteen days later, on September 2, 1998; (4) 
between the time of the initial consultation with Dr. Holbrook and the pelformance of surgery, 
"there was sufficient time for Sacred Heart Medical Center, to file an application for non-
emergency medical services." Id, 61 P.3d at 574. 
The Court further concluded that the medical records failed to support the Sacred Heart 
doctor's opinio~ provided after surgery on February 25, 1999, that the patient needed 
"immediate medical care" because he scheduled surgery sixteen days later. Id., 61 P3d at 574. 
The Court noted "[t]he determination of whether surgery is necessary is to be contrasted with 
whether a patient has received immediate medical care." Id, 61 P.3d at 574. (emphasis added) 
.... 
The fonner may require expert medical testimony to determine; a layperson can determine the 
latter. Id, 61 P .3d at 574. The Sacred Heart decision is somewhat distinguishable, since there 
was no showing or finding that the gallbladder surgery perfonned at the hospital in Lewiston was 
an "emergency" nor was there any application for county assistance for that procedure. Further, 
the contemplated surgery was "exploratory". 
In the case at issue, there is no dispute that when M.S. was admitted to the petitioner's 
hospital that there was an emergency need for medical treatment. The respondent does not 
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dispute the need for. emergency medical services at the time of admission to petitioner,s hospital 
on November 23, 2014. The dispute between the parties concerns the medical services provided 
to the patient after he was discharged from the petitioner's hospital on November 25, 2014. The 
additional medical treatment was received 6 days after his discharge from the hospital and it was 
7 days later when the patient underwent medically necessary surgery. The respondent's expert, 
Dr. Dammrose admits that the December follow up with Dr. Schoolfield and surgery was related 
to the diagnosis upon his original admittance_ to the hospital in November and that the December 
surgery was medically necessary. The Respondent, based on the opinion of Dr. Dammrose, talces . 
the position that since the patient did not have the surgery immediately and was able to wait at 
least 7 days that there was no "emergency" thereby requiring the filing of a 10-Day Non-
Emergency Application prior to his surgery. The Petitioner argues that the emergency continued 
after discharge of the patient and/or that the legislature did not envision the need for the filing of 
multiple applications. 
As set forth above J.C. § 31-3505 governs the time for the filing of an application for 
financial assistance. There is no dispute that all of the medical services claimed in the application 
were provided within the 31 days to file an emergency application. Since a timely emergency 
application was filed it was then the duty of the· respondent to conduct an investigation of the 
app~cation as to residency, indigency, and medical necessity. J.C. § 31-3505A. Upon the filing 
of a timely application the county commissioners are required to approve the application for 
financial assistance provided the county commissioners find that the patient was a "medically 
indigent resident" and that the patient was provided "necessary medical services". J.C. § 31-
3505B. 
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Within the statutory scheme of Chapter 35, the term "emergency,, or "emergency 
service" only appears within the section for definitions and the section concerning the time for 
. filing an application. I.C. § 31-3502; 31-3505. Statutory language is not to be viewed in a 
vacuum; this court must construe all of the applicable statutes together to determine legislative 
intent; and statues should not be construed in a manner that would result in absurd results. Saint 
.A.lphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159 Idaho at~ 356 P.3d at 382. 
Considering the policy behind Chapter 35 together with the general intent of the legislature, it is 
clear that whether medicai services are provided as an emergency or a nonemergency is only 
relevant as to the time ~thin which to fiJe an application for assistance. If a patient receives 
emergency medical care from a treatment provider, the provider _then has 31 dqs to file an 
application for the necessary medical services provided to the patient based on the presenting 
medical condition and provided the patient is a resident and is indigent, then the only remaining 
determination for the obligated county is to approve those medical services which were 
· "necessary medical services", 
In th.is case M.S. was admitted to St Luke's in Twin Falls on November 23, 2014 for 
"emergency services". 1be need for emergency services on November 23, 2014 is not in dispute. 
M.S. was treated at St. Luke's and was discharged _from the hospital on November 25, 2014 
because his infection had been stabilized and there was no medical reason to keep him in the 
hospital as long as he followed his antibiotic regimen. When he was discharged the 
~ded course of care was to follow up with a surgeon in Boise, because his medical 
condition required further medical care, including lung surgery.7 M.S. apparently continued his 
7 Cost-effectiveness is a consideration of "necessary medical services". If the hospital had kept the patient 
hospitalized when he could have been treated on an outpatient basil pending surgery, \he County could have come to 
1bo conclusJon that hospitalimtion ak November 25 and prior to December 2 was not a "DDCOBsary medical 
.-vice°. 
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antibiotic regimen after his discharge and 6 days later he followed up with Dr. Schoolfield who 
then determined that lung surgery was medically necessary and performed the same on 
December 9, 2014. M.S. was then discharged from St. Luke's on December 9, 2014 after 
successful surgery. Based on the presenting medical condition-ofM.S. on November 23, 2014, 
St, Lllke's.then filed a timely 31 day emergency application for emergency medical services 
provided to M.S. 
Since there was no dispute that M.S. was indigent and a resident of Twin Fal1s County 
and given the further fact, that both Dr. Dammrose and Dr. Schoolfield are of the opinion that the 
December, 2014 medical services were "necessary medical services", the county commissioners 
abused their discretion when they denied reimbursement for the December 1"9, 2014 medical 
services prQvided to M.S. by the petitioner. The abuse of discretion resulted from a 
misinterpretation of the statutory provisions of Title 31, Chapter 35. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Judicial Review is GRANTED and the 
matter is hereby_ REMANDED to the Respondent to approve the petitioner's application for 
financial ~sistance as to the December 1-9, 2014 medical services provided by the Petitioner. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthis lY: dayof~flt~OlS 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELNBRY 
I, undemgned, hereby certify that on 1h<: 14 dey of R 4 , 2015 a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MBMORAND~ DECISIO ON ruDICIAL REVIEW was 
mat1ed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following persons: 
Mark C. Peterson 
Attorney at Law 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock 
. & Fields, Chartered 
P.O.Box829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Melissa J. Kippes 
Deputy Prosecutor 
Twin Falls County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O.Box 126 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303 
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_'1=_1 ~~QM. 
OCT 11 2017 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
ST. LUKE'S HEAL TH SYSTEM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEM COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) CASE NO. CV-2017-145 
) 
) 
) ORDER ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Before the Court is St. Luke's Petition for Judicial Review of the Gem County Board of 
Commissioners' determination of approval for an indigent patient as medically necessary and 
emergent. Pursuant to the Idaho Medical Indigency Act, the County as a payer of last resort shall 
"pay for necessary medical services for the medically indigent residents of their counties ... " I.C. 
§ 31-3503(1 ). The statute defines "medically indigent" as any person who is in need of necessary 
medical services and is without income and/or other resources available to pay for them. I.C. § 
31-3502(17). The Act defines "necessary medical services" as services that are "clinically 
77
appropriate" and "the most cost-effective service" and shall not include "services provided by, or 
available to, an applicant from state, federal and local health programs." I.C. § 31-3502(18). 
The Court carefully reviewed the parties' briefing, the record, and heard oral arguments. 
Based on the facts of the case, this Court concludes that the Board correctly denied payment for 
the dates of service that were not medically necessary as statutorily defined by the Medical 
Indigency Act. Based on the plain language of the statute and the admission of both parties, C.H. 
was medically stable by February 18 and no longer needed the services of an acute care hospital. 
The Board's denial did not violate constitutional or statutory provisions, was not in excess of 
their statutory authority, was not made upon unlawful procedure, was supported by sufficient 
evidence, and was not an abuse of discretion. 
ORDER 
It is hereby ORDERED, the Board's Amended Determination of Approval for County 
Assistance is AFFIRMED. 
DATED this _L day of October, 2017. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J1_ day of October, 2017, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing order by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following persons: 
Mark C. Peterson 
HAWLEY TROXELL 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701 
208-344-6000 
mpeterson@hawleytroxell.com 
Tahja Jensen 
GEM COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
306 E. Main St. 
P.O. Box 671 
Emmett, ID 83617 
208-365-2106 
□ U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile 
0 Overnight Mail 
~E-Mail 
□ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile 
0 Overnight Mail 
~E-Mail 
~ ~l-tuY) 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477 
William K. Smith, ISB No. 9769 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 W. Main Street, Suite 1000 
Post Office Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 344-6000 
Facsimile (208) 954-5929 
mpeterson@hawleytroxell.com 
wsmith@hawleytroxell.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
F I A.!rGi? QM. 
NOV 1 7 2017 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
IN RE: MEDICAL INDIGENCY 
APPLICATION OF C.H. 
(Gem County Case No. 16-026), 
ST. LUKE'S HEALTH SYSTEM, LTD., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF GEM 
COUNTY, IDAHO, in their official capacity 
as the Board of County Commissioners for the 
County of Gem, State of Idaho, 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV2017-145 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: 
Filing Fee: 
L.4 
$129.00 
TO: THE GEM COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, AND ITS COUNSEL OF 
RECORD IN THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED ACTION, TAHJA JENSEN, GEM COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, 306 E. MAIN ST., P.O. BOX 671, EMMETT, IDAHO 
83617, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
40914.0131.10379021.2 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. ("Appellant" or "St. 
Luke's"), appeals against the above-named Respondent, Gem County Board of Commissioners, 
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order on Judicial Review entered in the above entitled 
action on October 11, 2017, the Honorable George A. Southworth, District Judge, presiding. 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment, 
decision and order described in paragraph 1 above are appealable under Idaho Appellate Rules 
ll(a)(2) and 1 l(f). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to 
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues shall not prevent the Appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal, are: 
a. Whether the District Court committed error when it ruled that the Gem 
County Board of Commissioners did not exceed its statutory authority 
when it denied St. Luke's compensation under the Idaho Medical 
Indigency Act for certain dates of service in a medical indigency 
application; 
b. Whether the District Court committed error when it ruled the Gem County 
Board of Commissioners correctly denied payment for dates of services 
where no alternative medical care was available to the patient; and 
c. Whether St. Luke's is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's transcripts in both hard copy 
and electronic format of the proceeding before the District Court. Pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
40914.013 l.10379021.2 
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V V 
Rule 25(c), the date and title of the proceeding is: October 10, 2017, hearing on Judicial Review 
before the Honorable George A. Southworth, Court Reporter Patty Terry. The number of 
transcript pages estimated is under 100. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules: 
DATE DESCRIPTION OF FILING 
March 6, 2017 Petition for Judicial Review 
April 14, 2017 Settled Agency Record and Agency Transcript 
May 17, 2017 St. Luke's Petitioner's Brief 
June 16, 2017 Gem County's Respondent's Brief 
July 7, 2017 St. Luke's Petitioner's Reply Brief 
October 11, 2017 District Court's Order on Judicial Review 
7. The Appellant requests any and all documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits by either party to be copied and sent to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below: 
Patty Terry 
415 E Main St #300 
Emmett, ID 83617 
b. That Appellant will pay for the preparation of the reporter's transcript 
once it has received an estimated cost; 
c. That Appellant will pay for preparation of the Clerk's Record once it has 
received an estimated cost; 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-3 
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; 
V 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this \'o"""'day ofNovember, 2017. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-4 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
By~R_ 
Mark C. Peterson,, ISB No. 6477 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
40914.0131.10379021.2 
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j 
V 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \9' day of November, 2017, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Patty Terry 
Gem County Court House 
415 E. Main Street, #300 
P.O. Box 671 
Emmett, ID 83617 
Tahja Jensen 
Gem County Prosecutor's Office 
306 E. Main Street 
P.O. Box 671 
Emmett, ID 83617 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
)ef U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
□ Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
□ E-mail 
}{U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
□ Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
□ E-mail 
□ Facsimile: (208) 365-9411 
Mark C. Peterson 
40914.0131.10379021.2 
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In Re: Medical Indigency Application 
of C.H. ( Gem County Case No. 16-026 
Petitioner/ Appel I ant 
vs. 
Board of Commisioners of Gem 
County, Idaho 
Respondents, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 456 14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Shelly Tilton. Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certify that I personally mailed, by United States 
Mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their 
Attorney of Record as follows: 
Attorney for Appellant 
****************** 
Mark Peterson 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
PO Box 161 7 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Respondent 
******************** 
Tahja Jenson 
Gem County Prosecutor's Office 
PO Box 671 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
IN WITNESS W~OF, r,ave hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this /:b day of~(!,. , 2018. 
SHELLY TILTON 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN A D FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In Re: Medical Indigency Application 
Of C.H. (Gem County Case No. 16-026) 
Plain ti m Appellant, 
VS. 
Board of Commissioners of 
Gem County. Idaho. 
Dcfendan t/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 45614 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT'S 
L SHELLY TILTON. Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State 
of ldaho. in and for the County of Gem. do hereby certify the following exhibit was used at the 
Motion I !earing: 
Plaintiff's/Petitioner's Exhibits: 
No Exhibits 
Defendant'-, F.xhibitlRepondent's Exhibits: 
Agency R.ecorrf Lodged Sent 
Sent Agency Transcript Lodged 
IN W!T:'JESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court at En1met1. Idaho this 16th day of April. 2018. 
CERTIFICATE OF EX I IIBITS 
SHELLY TILTON, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho. in and for the County of Gem. 
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fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-I E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In Re: Medical Indigency Application 
Of C.H. (Gem County Case \ro. 16-026) 
Plainti m Appellant, 
vs. 
Board of Commissioners of 
Gem County. Idaho, 
Defend,in t/Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 45614 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
L SHELLY TILTON. Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, of the 
State or Idaho. in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above ent itled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, fu ll 
and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
including all documents filed or lodged as requested in the Notice of Appeal. 
WIT ESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court 
at Emmett, Idaho. this I 61h day of Apri I. 20 18. 
SHELLY TILTON 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CCRTIFICATE 
